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50TH ANNUAL WILLIAM H. LEARY LECTURE
FIFTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: WHAT’S CHANGED?
Erwin Chemerinsky*
INTRODUCTION
It is a tremendous honor to have been asked to deliver the 50th annual William
H. Leary Lecture. In honor of this wonderful occasion, I want to identify what I think
are five of the most important changes in constitutional law over the last five decades
and then conclude by suggesting for you what I think are the five most
underappreciated Supreme Court cases for the last fifty years. To put this in some
context, over the last fifty years, fifteen justices have been appointed and confirmed
for the Supreme Court.1 Ten have been appointed by republican presidents; five were
appointed by democratic presidents.2 The earliest during this time confirmed for the
Supreme Court was Justice Thurgood Marshall.3 The most recent, of course, is
Justice Elena Kagan in the year 2010.4 All three of the Chief Justices, who have
assumed that role on the Supreme Court in the last fifty years, were appointed by
republican presidents: Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and now John Roberts.5
And the fact that ten of fifteen vacancies were filled by republican presidents, only
five by democrats, certainly shapes everything that’s occurred over the last five
decades.
I. THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Emergence of Unenumerated Rights
The first important development has been the debate over unenumerated rights
in the Constitution. I did some quick Westlaw research—I’m admittedly not very
good on Westlaw—but I tried to see if the words originalism and non-originalism
ever appeared earlier than 1966. I could find no law review article, no Supreme
Court case that ever used those words. Now, over the last several decades, certainly
constitutional scholars, yet also Supreme Court justices have been in a debate over
constitutional interpretation. The debate has been especially with regard to the
*
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appropriateness of the Supreme Court protecting rights that aren’t expressly
mentioned in the Constitution.
Originalism is the view that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed
when it is adopted and that it can be changed only through the amendment process.
Non-originalism, obviously by contrast, says the meaning of constitutional provision
can change by interpretation, as well as by amendment.
Griswold v. Connecticut,6 in 1965—fifty-one years ago now—was such an
important case in the Supreme Court, saying it could find rights that were not
enumerated in the Constitution.7 There, for better or worse, privacy was found by
Justice William Douglas to be safeguarded in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.8
Justice Douglas said that there are privacy aspects of the First Amendment, the Third
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment.9 It led one
commentator to say that Justice Douglas was like a cheerleader, skipping through
the Bill of Rights, saying, “Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I” and finding
privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.10 I checked this too, and in the last
fifty years there is no Supreme Court justice that has ever again found rights in
penumbras or emanations.
The debate over unenumerated rights has continued. On the current Court,
justices such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas declare themselves to be
originalists.11 Many justices of course embrace non-originalism.12 In confirmation
hearings of Supreme Court justices, there have been battles over non-originalism
and originalism. The most obvious of these was in 1987, when Robert Bork was
nominated for the Supreme Court and rejected, in large part, because of his views
about constitutional interpretation.13 In fact, there was an article by Robert Bork in
1971 titled “Toward Neutral Principles of the First Amendment” that began the idea
of the meaning of a constitution’s provisions should change only by amendment.14
He didn’t use the word originalism—that came later—but it was one of the most

6

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 482–83.
8
Id. at 483.
9
Id. at 483–85.
10
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic:
A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84 (1976).
11
Bradley P. Jacob, Will the Real Constitutional Originalist Please Stand Up?, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 595–96 (2007).
12
See, e.g., id. at 618 (noting that Justice Stevens is a non-originalist).
13
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1388–89
(1990) (book review).
14
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
INDIANA L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (promoting the idea of “neutral principles” in the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution).
7
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important initial defenses of it. Raoul Berger and his book, Government by
Judiciary,15 advanced this view.16
But, of course, it was Roe v. Wade,17 in 1973, that really raised consciousness
of academics, judges, the public, with regard to this debate over constitutional
interpretation.18 I think it’s fair to say that no Supreme Court decision in the last fifty
years has been more important with regard to the debate on unenumerated rights
than Roe v. Wade.
As I was thinking about this and preparing this lecture, I realized that though
there has been a heated debate over originalism versus non-originalism—whether
it’s appropriate for the Court to protect rights that are not enumerated to the
Constitution—the intellectual disagreement over interpretation hasn’t mattered all
that much with regard to Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court repeatedly
over the course of these fifty years has found unenumerated rights to be protected
by the Constitution.
The most recent example of this is the right to marry for gay and lesbian
couples. In Obergefell v. Hodges,19 on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court focused on
the right to marry as a fundamental right and found that state laws that prohibit samesex marriage are unconstitutional.20 This isn’t the first case to protect the right to
marry, even though that right isn’t mentioned in the Constitution. Loving v.
Virginia,21 in 1967, declared unconstitutional a Virginia law preventing interracial
marriage.22 The Court focused on equal protection, but the Court also explicitly said
that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected under the Constitution.23 To
pick other examples, the Supreme Court has said that parents have a fundamental
right to custody of their children: Stanley v. Illinois,24 in 1973.25 Again, that right is
not mentioned in the Constitution. The Court has said that there is a constitutional
right to keep the family together, including the extended family. This was the
holding in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,26 in 1976.27 Other enumerated rights
protected in the last half century include the right to engage in private, consensual,
same-sex sexual activity (Lawrence v. Texas,28 in 2003) and the right of competent
15

RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363 (1977).
16
Id. at 373–73.
17
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18
Id. at 152 (1973) (holding that there exists a right of privacy in the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights).
19
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
20
Id. at 2599, 2608–09.
21
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22
Id. at 11–12.
23
Id. at 12.
24
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
25
Id. at 651.
26
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
27
Id. at 506–07.
28
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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adults to refuse medical care, even lifesaving medical care (Cruzan v. Director of
Health Services).29
These are all basic rights. They are all deemed by the Supreme Court to be
crucial aspects of our autonomy. Notice all of these are cases in the last fifty years
and all are unenumerated rights. So, I do think as we look back on the last fifty years,
especially those of us who write about constitutional law, we have to start by talking
about this debate over constitutional interpretation over the last half century. But,
it’s interesting, it hasn’t been one that has kept the Court from protecting
unenumerated rights.
B. Shifts in Structure of Federalism and Separation of Powers
The second change that I would identify over the last fifty years has been the
shift of having the Supreme Court protect the structure of government: federalism
and separation of powers. From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was declared
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
From 1937 until 1992, only one federal law was found to violate the Tenth
Amendment and infringe the state’s rights and that case was overruled nine years
later.30 One of the things that I’ve been doing for a long time now is lecturing to
students getting ready for the bar exam. I remember when I started doing this, telling
them if there is an answer to a bar question that says that a federal law exceeds the
scope of Congress’s commerce power, it’s always a wrong answer. Or, if there is an
answer that says that a federal law violates the Tenth Amendment, that’s always a
wrong answer.
But of course, that’s changed. In United States v. Lopez,31 in 1995, the Supreme
Court—for the first time since 1937—struck down a federal law as exceeding the
scope of the commerce power.32 Lopez as you might remember declared
unconstitutional the Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act (federal law that made it a
federal crime to have guns within 1000 feet of a school).33 This case led the way to
other important decisions limiting the scope of the commerce power. In United
States v. Morrison,34 in 2000, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the civil
damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act,35 a provision of a federal
law that allows victims of gender-motivated violence—rape, sexual assault,
domestic violence—to sue their assailants in federal court.36

29

Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
31
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32
Id. at 551.
33
See id.
34
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
35
Id. at 627.
36
See id. at 605–06.
30
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Most recently, in National Federation Business v. Sebelius,37 five justices
would have said that the individual mandate exceeds the scope of Congress’s
commerce power—that it was Congress regulating inactivity; people not buying
insurance—that Congress only can regulate “activity.”38 And, as I mentioned with
regard to the Tenth Amendment, for so many years the Court left the protection of
the states to the political process. But in New York v. United States,39 in 1992, and
in Printz v. United States,40 in 1997, the Court said it violates the Tenth Amendment
for Congress to commandeer the states, for Congress to force the state to pass laws,
and enact regulations.41 This enforcement of the structural guarantee of federalism
was unheard of when this lecture began fifty years ago, but now it is such an
important part of constitutional law.
Judicial protection of states has manifested itself in many ways. Just a few years
ago, in June 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder,42 the Supreme Court for the first time
since the nineteenth century declared unconstitutional a federal civil rights law
dealing with race.43 There, the Court declared unconstitutional, a key provision of
the Voting Rights Act,44 which required that states with a history of race
discrimination in voting get preapproval before changing their election systems.
The Supreme Court has tremendously expanded the sovereign immunity of
state governance over the last fifty years. During the 1960s, the Court was making
it easier to sue states.45 But, if you look at the cases since then, the Supreme Court
has limited the ability of Congress to authorize suits against states.46 The Supreme
Court has said that states not only can’t be sued in federal court, but can’t be sued in
state court either—even to enforce federal laws.47
Just as the Court has protected federalism more in the last fifty years than in the
prior decades, so is that true with regard to separation of powers. From 1950 to 1975,
I can’t identify a single instance in which a presidential action was declared
unconstitutional as violating separation of powers. From 1950 until the 1980s, I can’t
identify a single instance where a federal law was struck down as infringing
37

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2587.
39
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
40
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
41
See New York, 505 U.S. at 188; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
42
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
43
Id. at 2618–19.
44
See id.
45
See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (holding that a state’s sovereign
immunity “is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing
a federally protected right”).
46
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (“Even
when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States.”).
47
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1999) (holding that Congress could not
subject nonconsenting states to private suits in state courts for violation of federal law).
38
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separation of powers—where Congress was interfering with the powers of another
branch of government. But, of course, in 1974, in United States v. Nixon,48 the
Supreme Court held that President Nixon would violate separation of powers by
keeping the Watergate tapes secret. The Court said that under separation of powers,
executive privilege must yield and cannot interfere with the ability of courts to
perform their essential functions.49
In the 1980s, in Chadha v. INS,50 the Supreme Court struck down a federal law
that included legislative veto provisions, which gave Congress the ability by
resolution to overturn executive actions. This invalidated provisions in 300 federal
statutes.51 Most recently—just in May of this year—in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,52 the
Supreme Court struck down a federal law on separation of powers grounds.53 This
was a law that was adopted in 2002 that said that if an American citizen had a child
born in Jerusalem, the American citizen could have the child’s passport indicate the
birthplace as Jerusalem, Israel.54 The Supreme Court, 5–4, said that this infringed
the president’s sole power to decide whether to recognize foreign governments.55
The Supreme Court over the last half century then has revived judicial protection of
the structural guarantees of the Constitution in a way that didn’t exist or rarely
existed in the prior decades. The Supreme Court would say that it’s gone back to the
vision of the framers; that the structure of government is the primary protector of
individual liberties under the Constitution.
C. Restriction to Court Access
The third change that I would identify in constitutional law over the last half
century has been the restriction in access to the courts. Now I often remark that if
the Supreme Court were to hold that the government can give unlimited amounts of
money to parochial schools, that would make headlines of every newspaper. But if
the Supreme Court says no one has standing to challenge the government giving
unlimited amounts of money to parochial schools, no newspapers would pay
attention at all. Restrictions of access to the courts are largely invisible to the general
public—maybe to even most attorneys. But a right is meaningless if it can’t be
enforced. And, I would suggest to you that there have been more restrictions on
access to the courts imposed in the last half century than in the prior half century
and by a large multiplier effect.
In fact, in the 1960s it seemed that the Supreme Court was greatly liberalizing
access to the courts. It was relaxing barriers like standing. In Flast v. Cohen,56 in
48

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 703–05.
50
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
51
Id. at 958.
52
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
53
Id. at 2096.
54
Id. at 2082.
55
Id. at 2096.
56
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
49
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1969, at the end of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court said taxpayers have
standing to challenge government expenditures that violate the Establishment
Clause.57 This involved a law where the federal government was giving financial aid
directly to parochial schools, and the Court said that the taxpayer, with no other
injury than that, had standing to bring the suit.58 Since Flast v. Cohen, in every case
without exception, the Supreme Court has rejected the ability of taxpayers to have
standing to sue in federal court.59 Initially, the Court rejected taxpayer standing
outside of the Establishment Clause context, and then the Supreme Court has
progressively restricted that exception and denied taxpayer standing even to enforce
the Establishment Clause.60
In fact, just focusing on standing, there are so many ways in the last half century
that the Supreme Court has limited who has standing to sue. I’ll just mention a few
examples. Take City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,61 in 1982. Adolf Lyons was a twentyfour-year-old African American man.62 He was stopped by a police officer in Los
Angeles for having a burnt out tail light.63 The officer slammed Lyons’ hands above
his head; Lyons complained that the keys were cutting into his palm.64 The officer
then administered a choke hold on Lyons and rendered him unconscious.65 Lyons
awoke spitting blood and dirt; he had urinated and defecated.66 The officer gave him
a traffic citation for having a burnt out tail light and let him go.67 Lyons did some
research and discovered to that point, sixteen people in Los Angeles—almost all like
him, African American men—had died from the police use of the choke hold.68 He
sued the city of Los Angeles for an injunction to stop officers from using the choke
hold except where necessary to protect the officer’s life and safety.69 But the
Supreme Court ruled that Lyons lacked standing.70 The Supreme Court said a
plaintiff like Lyons seeking an injunction must show a likelihood that he or she
personally will suffer the injury again.71 There are hundreds of lower court cases that

57

Id. at 105–06.
See id. at 85–86, 105–06.
59
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974); DaimlerChrsyler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 345–46 (2006).
60
See, e.g., Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 168 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision devastates taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases.”).
61
461 U.S. 95 (1983).
62
Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 114–15.
65
Id. at 115.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 115–16.
69
Id. at 98 (majority opinion).
70
Id. at 105–06.
71
Id. at 111–12.
58
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have been dismissed based on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons for standing.72 There is
ongoing practice—it is apparent that someone will be hurt by it—but there is no
standing because it cannot be shown that the particular person is likely to be injured
again.
Or take a more recent case on standing: Clapper v. Amnesty International.73 In
2008, Congress amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to allow the
National Security Agency (“NSA”) to gather information by intercepting
communications from those in the United States and those in foreign countries.74
Under the law, the NSA can listen to conversations and read email exchanges.75
Lawyers brought a challenge to this.76 They said they represented clients in foreign
countries, in places where the communications were being intercepted. They said
that they had a duty to protect the attorney-client privilege.77 They said they couldn’t
communicate by email or phone any longer—that that interfered with their ability to
protect their clients’ interests.78 The only way to talk to their clients would be
travel.79 Plaintiffs also included journalists who said they talked to sources in foreign
countries and their communication was inhibited.80 Business people also were
plaintiffs and made the same claim.
But the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that the suit had to be dismissed for lack of
standing.81 The Supreme Court said none of the plaintiffs could show that their
communications were intercepted or likely to be intercepted.82 The NSA doesn’t tell
people when it’s intercepting their communications, and so, therefore, there was no
standing.
When you think of cases like Lyons or Clapper, there’s no analog prior to fifty
years ago. These are new. The Supreme Court has imposed other standing
requirements requiring that the plaintiff prove causation.83 The plaintiff must prove
that a favorable court decision will remedy the injury in order for the plaintiff to
72

See, e.g., Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a detainee
in a county correctional facility lacked standing to challenge county policy of requiring strip
searches of all detainees); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644,
686–89 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge NSA’s Terrorist
Surveillance Program because they could not prove imminent harm); Schirmer v. Nagode,
621 F.3d 581, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding protesters that were arrested did not have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of city’s disorderly conduct ordinance).
73
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
74
Id. at 1144.
75
Id. at 1143–44.
76
Id. at 1145.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1145–46.
80
Id. at 1148.
81
Id. at 1155.
82
Id. at 1147–48.
83
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (holding that
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” is one element of
standing).
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have standing.84 These are very much restrictions on access to the court and typical
of so many areas where the Supreme Court has done this in the last half century.
I’ll take another area here to illustrate how over the last half century the
Supreme Court has so often closed access to the courts. Here, let me talk about
what’s going on with regard to habeas corpus in the last fifty years. The Warren
Court very much liberalized habeas corpus. For example, in Fay v. Noia,85 in 1963,
the Supreme Court said let individuals come to federal court with a writ of habeas
corpus, unless it can be proven that they deliberately bypassed state proceedings.86
The attitude in the Warren Court was that if something wasn’t raised in state court,
it was probably an attorney error. In any event, it’s not fair to bind the criminal
defendant by that mistake.
But beginning with the Burger Court and continuing with the Rehnquist and
the Roberts Courts, the Supreme Court has imposed many new restrictions on habeas
corpus. The Court, for example, has said that Fourth Amendment claims can’t be
raised on habeas corpus at all. A criminal defendant cannot argue that the police
engaged in an illegal search and that the evidence should have been suppressed. This
was the holding in Stone v. Powell,87 in 1976. The Supreme Court has said if
something wasn’t raised below, there is a strong presumption that it cannot be raised
on habeas corpus.88 Wainwright v. Sykes89 said that it could only be raised on habeas
if the petitioner could show good cause for not being raised and prejudice. This is
based on the assumption that defendants should be bound by their attorney’s
choices.90 And then in 1996, Congress adopted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act that imposes so many additional restrictions on habeas corpus.91
It says generally one and only one habeas petition.92 It says there is a one-year statute
of limitations usually from the end of the state court proceedings.93 It says that a
federal court can grant habeas corpus only if the state court decision was contrary to
or an unreasonable application of a clearly established law as articulated by the
Supreme Court.94 Estimates are now, as a result of all of these restrictions, well under
5% (and some estimates go as low as 2%) of all habeas petitions are granted. It
means that individuals who are unconstitutionally convicted—even innocent
individuals—often cannot get their day in court.
84

See id. at 561 (holding that it “must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’”) (citations omitted).
85
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
86
Id. at 438–39.
87
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
88
Id. at 494–95.
89
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
90
Id. at 87.
91
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 101 18 U.S.C. § 440(a)
(2012).
92
Id. at § 104 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2254 to prevent successive habeas corpus
applications with few exceptions).
93
Id. at § 101.
94
Id. at § 103.
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Standing and habeas corpus are examples of restrictions of access to the courts.
I could mention so many others that have gone on over the last half century that have
limited the ability of people whose rights have been violated to have access to the
courts.
D. An Expansion of Freedom of Speech
The fourth change that I would identify over the last half century is the much
greater commitment to freedom of speech, except when the institutional interests of
the Government are at stake. If you look at the course of American history with
regard to freedom of speech, robust protection of expression is something relatively
new. I think that the modern era starts just a little bit earlier than a half century ago.
New York Times v. Sullivan,95 in 1964, is a key case that shifts the Supreme Court’s
protection of freedom of speech and increases the protection of expression.96 New
York Times v. Sullivan said that the First Amendment limits the ability of a person,
who is a public official or running for public office, to win a defamation suit.97 New
York Times v. Sullivan said that if a plaintiff is a public official or running for public
office, the plaintiff can win a defamation suit only by proving with clear and
convincing evidence falsity of the statement and actual malice.98 The Supreme Court
said that it is essential that there be robust open debate about those holding and
running for public office.99 The Court said that the freedom of speech needs
breathing space, so that even false speech is protected by the First Amendment.100
Harry Kalven, then a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, said that
New York Times v. Sullivan was an occasion for dancing in the streets, speaking of
its importance with regard to expression.101
And I think that the Supreme Court largely over the last half century has been
very protective of speech. Think of the types of speech that had been restricted in
the prior fifty years. So many of the most important free speech cases in the prior
half century dealt with incitement of illegal activity. The Supreme Court was very
deferential during that prior half century when the government wanted to punish
people who advocated illegal activity—were advocating to overthrow the United
States government. But that changed in Brandenburg v. Ohio,102 in 1969, where the
Supreme Court says a person can be punished for inciting illegal activity only if
there is a substantial likelihood of imminent illegality and only if the speech is

95

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 292.
97
See id. at 271.
98
Id. at 279–80.
99
Id. at 270–71.
100
Id. at 271–72.
101
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting philosopher Alexander
Meiklejohn).
102
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
96
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directed at causing it.103 Since then, the Supreme Court has hardly dealt with the
issue of incitement and lower courts have been much more protective of speech.
In the prior half century, so many of the Supreme Court cases and lower court
cases involved sexual speech, specifically obscenity prosecutions. The last major
Supreme Court case about obscenity was in 1973, in Miller v. California,104 where
the Court reformulated the definition of obscenity.105 In large part, I think the
absence of Supreme Court cases about obscenity is the results of changes in social
attitudes. Our society has become much more tolerant and permissive with regard to
sexual speech and so it is not surprising there are fewer prosecutions. But I also think
it reflects a judiciary that is much more protective of speech than it had been in the
prior half century.
Over the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has expanded the types of speech
that are protected. Earlier in the 1940s, the Court said that commercial advertising
wasn’t speech protected by the First Amendment at all.106 In the 1970s, the Court
changed that and said commercial speech is protected, and increasingly there has
been a robust protection of commercial speech.107
I think the cases that most reflect the change in attitude by the Supreme Court
over speech in the last half century are those in where the Court has made clear that
offensive speech, even very deeply offensive speech, is protected by the First
Amendment. Snyder v. Phelps108 is illustrative. It involves a small church out of
Topeka, Kansas—the Westboro Baptist Church—that goes to military funerals and
uses this as an occasion for expressing a very vile antigay/antilesbian message.109
Matthew Snyder was a marine who died in military service in Iraq.110 The members
of the Westboro Baptist Church went to his funeral in Maryland.111 They asked a
police officer where they could stand; the officer pointed to a spot about one
thousand feet away from the funeral.112 Before the funeral, they chanted and sang;
during the funeral they were silent, but they held up signs with offensive slogans.113
That night, Matthew’s father, Albert, saw on the news footage, where he could read
the signs; he was deeply offended.114 He sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy.115 The federal court jury awarded him ten million
dollars in damages, including both compensatory and punitive damages. But the
United States Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, held that the damage award
103

Id. at 447.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
105
Id. at 16.
106
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
107
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violated the First Amendment.116 Here too, the importance of New York Times v.
Sullivan is apparent, because it was there that the Court held that tort liability is
limited by the First Amendment, just like criminal liability is limited by the First
Amendment.117 But most of all, what Snyder v. Phelps stands for is the proposition
that speech cannot be the basis of liability or punishment, even though it’s offensive,
even very deeply offensive.118
But, there was a “but” in my statement. And that is but the Supreme Court has
not been protective of speech when the institutional interests of government are at
stake. So for instance, if it is student speech being regulated by a school, the Supreme
Court has not been protective of student expression much at all. Early in these fifty
years in Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education,119 the Court eloquently declared
that students don’t leave their free speech rights at the schoolhouse gate. But in every
speech case involving students since then, the Supreme Court has ruled for the
Government against the students.120 The most recent case, Morse v. Frederick,121 in
2007, is illustrative. The Olympic torch was coming through Juneau, Alaska.122 A
school released its students to stand on the sidewalk and watch.123 A student got
together with his friends and held up a banner that said quote, “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.”124 At the oral argument, Justice Souter said he had no idea what that
meant.125 But the principal thought it was a message to encourage illegal drug use.126
She confiscated the banner and suspended the students from school.127 The case went
to the Supreme Court. 5–4 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the principal of the
school.128As Justice Stevens said, it’s hard to believe that any student—the smartest
or the slowest—are more likely to use marijuana because of this banner.129 The Court
didn’t require any showing of that. The Court just deferred to the school.
Another example where the institutional interests of government are at stake is
the speech of government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,130 in 2006, the
Supreme Court said there is no free speech protection for the speech of government
employees on the job in the scope of their duties.131 Speech on military bases is
116
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another example. I argued a case in the Supreme Court two years ago, United States
v. Apel,132 about the right of a person to demonstrate on a public area of a military
base—actually the side of a major public road, the Pacific Coast Highway.133 I lost
by the close margin of nine to nothing.134 So yes, there is a far greater commitment
now by the Supreme Court, lower courts, and our society to freedom of speech. But
this is a commitment that ends when there’s an institutional interest of the
government at stake.
E. An Increased Emphasis on Equality
The fifth and final change that I would identify is a much greater commitment
to equality on the part of the Supreme Court, though it’s often least manifest with
regard to racial equality and especially with regard to racial equality in schools. It
might surprise you, if you haven’t studied constitutional law recently, to know that
it wasn’t until 1971, in Reed v. Reed,135 that the Supreme Court for the first time in
American history found sex discrimination unconstitutional.136 It wasn’t until a few
years after that that the Supreme Court for the first time indicated that some form of
heightened scrutiny would be used for sex discrimination.137 It wasn’t until 1976 that
the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren138 formulated the test we know as intermediate
scrutiny and said that is to be used for sex discrimination; sex discrimination will be
allowed only if it is substantially related to an important government interest.139 It is
only in the last fifty years that the Supreme Court has protected noncitizens from
discrimination and that the Court has protected children or nonmarital children from
discrimination.140 And obviously it’s only in the last fifty years and really only in
the last twenty years that the Supreme Court has protected gays and lesbians from
discrimination. The first Supreme Court case ever to protect gays and lesbians from
discrimination wasn’t until 1996, in Romer v. Evans,141 and the most recent, of
course, is Obergefell v. Hodges,142 on June 26th of last year.
So in all of these ways, there’s a much greater commitment to equality. And
yet, I have to pause when we talk about racial equality. Here, the Supreme Court’s
record is much more mixed, if not even dismal. The Supreme Court over these last
fifty years has held that disparate impact isn’t enough to prove race discrimination
under equal protection.143 Or to put it in more formal language of constitutional law,
132

134 S. Ct. 1144 (2014).
Id. at 1148–49.
134
Id. at 1146.
135
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
136
Id. at 76–77.
137
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–83 (1973).
138
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
139
Id. at 197–98.
140
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968).
141
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
142
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
143
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–46 (1976).
133

702

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

just showing a discriminatory effect isn’t enough to get more than rational basis.144
Washington v. Davis,145 in 1976, involved a Washington D.C. ordinance that said in
order to be a police officer, a person had to pass a test.146 Statistics showed that
African Americans failed that test much more often than whites.147 But the Supreme
Court said that’s not race discrimination, that’s just a discriminatory effect,
discriminatory purpose must be proven to establish the existence of a racial
classification.148 Another example is McCleskey v. Kemp,149 in 1987. It involved a
man, Warren McCleskey, who had been sentenced to death by a jury in Georgia.150
A law professor, the late David Baldus from the University of Iowa, did studies to
prove that the death penalty administered in Georgia was racially discriminatory.151
The statistics were compelling. But the Supreme Court, 5–4, said that the statistics
only show a disparate impact and that isn’t enough to establish a racial
classification.152 The Supreme Court said that the criminal defendant had to prove
either that the legislature in Georgia adopted the death penalty because of a
discriminatory purpose or that this jury acted out of discriminatory purpose.153 It’s
so difficult to prove discriminatory purpose. Rarely anymore, thankfully, will
decision-makers express racist motivations. And yet, without being able to use
disparate impact, it is so difficult to deal with the problem of race discrimination in
society. So much of racism is the result of unconscious, implicit bias. Therefore,
generally, there’s not going to be the evidence to prove discriminatory intent to
accompany the disparate impact.
But where I think the Supreme Court has failed the most with regard to race is
with regard to school desegregation. Brown v. Board of Education,154 of course,
came down on May 17, 1954. A decade after Brown, in 1964, virtually nothing had
been done to achieve desegregation in the South.155 In Alabama, Mississippi and
South Carolina in 1964, not one African American child was attending school with
a white child.156 In North Carolina, which has always prided itself on being a more
progressive southern state, only one-tenth of African Americans were attending
144
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school with whites in 1964.157 But then things began to change. In 1964, the Supreme
Court declared that there has been all too much deliberation and not enough speed.158
That same year, Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act.159 Title VI says that
recipients of federal funds can’t discriminate based on race.160 The then Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare said any school system segregated by race would
be deemed to discriminate and could not get federal funds.161 Every school system
depends on federal funds.
From 1964 to 1988, by every measure, American public schools were less
racially segregated. Since 1988, every year American public schools have become
more racially segregated.162 And according to UCLA professor Gary Orfield, they’re
becoming more racially segregated at an accelerating rate.163 And I think Supreme
Court decisions are largely responsible for this. I point to Milliken v. Bradley,164 in
1977 that said that there cannot be interdistrict remedies for school segregation.165
Students generally cannot be taken from suburbs and moved to city schools, or from
cities and moved to suburban schools. The result is, very little in the way of
meaningful school desegregation can be achieved. In most major cities, the school
systems are 80% or 90% more minority students.166 Unless students can be brought
across district lines, desegregation cannot be achieved. In Oklahoma City v.
Dowell,167 in 1991, the Supreme Court said once a school system has achieved socalled unitary status, federal court desegregation orders must end even when it’s
going to mean the resegregation of the schools.168 And most recently in 2007, in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,169 the
Supreme Court said that school systems cannot on their own use race as a factor of
assigning students into their schools to achieve diversity and desegregation.170 These
cases—Milliken, Oklahoma City v. Dowell, Parents Involved—all are responsible
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for what has increasingly become separate and unequal schools.171 So that’s why I
say that generally, there has been a greater commitment to equality by the Supreme
Court, but it’s been much less evident with regard to race.
II. THE MOST IMPORTANT DECISIONS
I want to conclude by giving you my opinion of the five most important
Supreme Court cases over the last half century. And I’ll do that, but I realize it would
be more useful to conclude by talking about what I regard as the five most
underappreciated Supreme Court cases.
As for the most important cases, I will list them alphabetically and begin with
Baker v. Carr172 and Reynolds v. Sims.173 I’m grouping them together as one. Those
are the Supreme Court cases that said that challenges to malapportionment of state
legislatures could be heard by the federal courts and that for any elected body, there
must be one person, one vote; all districts must be about the same in population.
When Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice, he was asked what were the most
important rulings during his tenure.174 He pointed to those cases, Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims, since state legislatures never were going to reapportion themselves
and these rulings were crucial for protecting the democratic process.175
I would put Bush v. Gore176 on my list of the most important five cases in the
last fifty years. It is the first time that the Supreme Court played a role in deciding a
presidential election. Maybe it did decide that presidential election—we’ll never
know. And certainly I think it’s a case that changed the way many people perceive
the United States Supreme Court, for better or for worse.
I would put Obergefell v. Hodges177 on my list of the five most important
Supreme Court cases in the last fifty years. Obergefell v. Hodges, of course, is the
case where the Supreme Court said that state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage
are unconstitutional.178 It’s obviously enormously important for the ability of gays
and lesbians to marry, but it’s also important in terms of the Supreme Court so
171
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emphatically rejecting originalism, so clearly embracing a non-originalist approach
to interpreting the Constitution.
I would think that anyone’s list of the five most important cases in the last fifty
years would also include Roe v. Wade.179 Obviously it’s important for the millions
of women who have had the chance to decide for themselves whether to continue or
terminate a pregnancy. But no case has more shaped the public and scholarly debate
about constitutional interpretation and the role of the courts than Roe v. Wade.
And fifth on my list of the most important would be United States v. Nixon.180
Nixon stands for the proposition that no one—not even the president of the United
States—is above the law.181
But those are cases that are all familiar. I want to conclude by identifying what
I regard as the five most underappreciated cases from the Supreme Court from the
last half century. So again, I’m doing these alphabetically. I would start my list with
Buckley v. Valeo,182 in 1976. Everyone is familiar with Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission.183 That’s where the Supreme Court held that corporations
can spend unlimited amounts of money to get candidates elected or defeated.184 But
Citizens United was very much built on the earlier case in Buckley v. Valeo.185
Buckley v. Valeo is the case where the Supreme Court said spending money in
election campaigns is a form of speech.186 Buckley v. Valeo is the case that said that
the government cannot regulate independent expenditures; that the wealthy have the
right to spend as much as they want to get candidates elected or defeated.187 The
Court ruled that expenditure limits are always unconstitutional.188 And Buckley v.
Valeo, more than any other Supreme Court decision in history, has shaped the very
nature of our political landscape.
Second on my list of the most underappreciated cases is Circuit City v.
Adams,189 in 2001. Of all the cases that I’m talking about tonight, it’s the case that
affects nearly all of us in this room. It’s Circuit City v. Adams that says that
arbitration clauses, even in employments contracts, are enforceable and can preclude
civil rights suits in federal court.190 Circuit City v. Adams involved a man who
applied for a job at Circuit City.191 He filled out his job application and on the back
of the application there was a lot of fine print; a lone clause on the back of the job
application that said that if he ever had any grievances or lawsuits against Circuit
179
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City, they would have to go to arbitration.192 He couldn’t go to court. His lawyer
brought a race discrimination claim on his behalf under California state law in
California court.193 The lawyer didn’t want it to be removed to federal court.194 But
Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal court under a 1925 statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act, to compel arbitration.195 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision,
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to say that arbitration should be compelled.196
Of course, it was this case that then paved the way to decisions like AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion197 and American Express v. Italian Colors,198 where the Court has
held that arbitration clauses in employment contracts, consumer contracts, medical
contracts, are all enforceable.199
Not long ago I went to see a new eye doctor for the first time and I was given a
big stack of papers to fill out. In the middle was a form I was asked to sign, that if I
had any claims against the doctor I could not sue the doctor in court—I’d have to go
to arbitration. I asked the receptionist if the doctor would still see me if I didn’t sign
the form. She said she didn’t know. Nobody had ever asked her that question before.
Around the same time, I bought a new Dell computer, and as you know in order
to use a computer or an iPad for the first time, you have to click that you’ve read the
terms, and agree to them. For the iPad, they are forty-six pages long. Well I never
read—I just click and use the machine. But in this instance, I read the terms. And
sure enough there was a clause that said that in any claims against Dell with regard
to the computer, I had to go to arbitration. I couldn’t go to court. I wrote Dell a letter
saying I did not agree to that clause and by opening the envelope of my letter they
were agreeing I could sue them in court if there was a dispute. Dell didn’t write back
but the computer sort of still works.
Circuit City v. Adams affects all of us because our consumer contracts—maybe
our employment contracts, maybe our medical contracts—now have arbitration
clauses and they are enforceable.
The third case that I would put on my list of the underappreciated is New York
v. United States,200 in 1992. I briefly mentioned it earlier. The case involved a federal
law, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, that required that every state
clean up its nuclear waste by 1996.201 The Supreme Court declared this
unconstitutional as violating the Tenth Amendment.202 The Supreme Court said that
Congress violates the Tenth Amendment if it commandeers the states, forcing them
to enact laws and adopt regulations. Why does this case matter so much? Prior to
192
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1992, the Supreme Court, since 1937, had said that the protection of states as states
is left to the political process. In fact, in a 1985 case, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transportation District,203 the Supreme Court explicitly said the
protection of states is left to the political process.204 It’s New York v. United States
that changes that. It’s New York v. United States that paves the way for all of the
Supreme Court’s decisions about federalism that I was referring to earlier.
Fourth on my list of the most underappreciated cases is San Antonio Board of
Education v. Rodriguez,205 in 1973. The case involved a challenge to the Texas
system of funding public schools largely through local property taxes.206 The result
was that poor areas had to tax at a very high rate and had relatively little to spend on
education.207 Wealthy areas could tax at a low rate and had a great deal to spend on
education.208 But the Supreme Court, 5–4, upheld the Texas system.209 Justice Lewis
Powell wrote for the Court. He was joined by the other three Nixon appointees:
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and an Eisenhower appointee Potter Stewart.210
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court said that poverty is not a suspect classification,
discrimination against the poor doesn’t get more than rational basis review, and
education is not a fundamental right.211 Rodriguez, together with cases like Milliken
v. Bradley, that I mentioned earlier, have led to separate and unequal schools in the
United States, something that plagues and affects all of us.212
Fifth and finally on my list of underappreciated cases is Terry v. Ohio,213 in
1968. Terry v. Ohio is the case that says that police can stop and frisk only on the
basis of reasonable suspicion; they don’t need to have probable cause in order to be
able to stop and frisk.214 What’s interesting is there’s now been a release of some of
the justices’ papers from that time. We know that especially Justice Thurgood
Marshall was very concerned about how the police would use this greater authority
to stop and to frisk, especially against people of color.215 The experience of the last
several years confirms that the discretion of the police to stop and to frisk often is
used in a racially discriminatory way.
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CONCLUSION
I was thinking of trying to conclude by projecting ahead fifty years and imagine
what the professor is going to be talking about when he or she gives the 100th
anniversary of the Leary Lecture. And then I realized that’s impossible. No one fifty
years ago could have imagined things like the rise of fundamentalism across the
globe and the terrors that resulted from it. Technological changes, like the internet,
that so alter the way in which we communicate and express ourselves, could not
have been imagined. The moral changes, such as the recognition of rights for gays
and lesbians, including the right to marriage equality—would have been unthinkable
a half century ago.
So I conclude with the one prediction I’m sure about. I truly believe that over
the next fifty years there will be, as there was in the prior fifty years, an expansion
of freedom; an increase in equality. Because here I believe, and I’ll conclude with
this, that the late Dr. Martin Luther King got it right when he said, “The arc of the
moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”216
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